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On January 1, 1989, the much-heralded—or much-
maligned, depending on which side of the border 
you sit—U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
went into effect. With only a year and a half under 
its belt, the FTA continues to generate discussion 
and debate in Canada, as it has ever since Prime 
Minister Mulroney proposed the idea at the 
"Shamrock Summit" in 1985. The FTA is actually 
generating some columns in the U.S. press as well. 
Agricultural and natural-resource topics remain 
prominent in U.S.-Canadian trade issues. 
With respect to agricultural trade, this paper at-
tempts to summarize what the FTA has done, what it 
has not done, and what it might do in the future. 
The direct, measurable effects of the FTA on ag-
ricultural trade are small, generating perhaps a 1 
percent increase in U.S. agricultural exports in 1989 
and an even smaller increase in U.S. agricultural 
imports from Canada. Although not measurable, 
more important have been the indirect effects of 
the FTA on policy and trade in both countries. 
Because the FTA basically left both countries' ag-
ricultural and trade policies intact, numerous trade 
problems continue, about which the FTA has had 
little to say. But in a broader perspective, the FTA 
may be a harbinger of the future if regional trading 
arrangements and greater economic integration as-
sume greater importance in the world trading en-
vironment. If this case proves true, even the limited 
coverage of agriculture in the FTA may prove to 
be important. 
What Has the FTA Done? 
The agricultural provisions of the FTA are gener-
ally limited and narrow, with the exception of the 
staged tariff removal on all products. The major 
items include: 
• Article 701: public entities cannot export ag-
ricultural goods to the other country at a price 
Carol Goodloe is an economist wilh ihe Economic Research Service. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
below the acquisition price, plus storage and 
handling costs; Canadian goods (eligible grains 
and oilseeds) shipped to the U.S. through West 
Coast ports are excluded from receiving trans-
port subsidies. 
• Article 702: tariff snapback on fresh fruits and 
vegetables. 
• Article 704: both countries exclude each other 
from their respective meat import laws. 
• Article 705: Canada will take off its import 
license on wheat, barley, and oats when the 
U.S. government support level for each grain 
is equal to or less than Canadian government 
support. The support methodology is con-
tained in Annex 705.4. 
• Article 706: Canada enlarges its global import 
quotas for chicken, turkey, and shell eggs. 
• Article 707: the U.S. will not place any quan-
titative import restriction or fee on Canadian 
imports of products containing 10 percent or 
less sugar. 
• Article 708: technical regulations and stan-
dards. 
• Chapter 8: regulations regarding listing, pric-
ing, and distribution policies for wine and dis-
tilled spirits, primarily aimed at the Canadian 
wine industry. 
Before examining some of the trade and policy 
effects of specific provisions of the FTA, one can 
boldly state that the FTA—or at least the process 
of negotiation—turned the U.S. from a net agri-
cultural importer from Canada into a net agricul-
tural exporter. This curious shift results from a 
deficiency in U.S. export data that became increas-
ingly evident during the FTA negotiations. 
Change in the Bilateral Trade Balance 
If one looks at U.S. agricultural exports to and 
imports from Canada, using official U.S. data from 
the Census Bureau of the Department of Com-
merce, the U.S. became a net agricultural importer 
from Canada in 1985. However, using Canadian 
import data in lieu of U.S. export data shows the Goodfae           The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and Agriculture: One Year Later    81 
U.S. had an agricultural trade surplus of over $620 
million in 1985. 
Discrepancies often exist between two countries' 
export and import data (that is, what a country 
reports as exports rarely matches what the receiving 
country says it imported from that same country) 
because of differences in reporting requirements, 
shipping periods, and other administrative factors. 
The census data, however, substantially understate 
U.S. exports to Canada because of undocumented 
shipments. The magnitude of the discrepancy ap-
pears unique to Canada and likely results from the 
long, relatively unguarded border between the two 
countries. A comparison of U.S. export data with 
Canadian import data reveals that the underreporting 
problem worsened in the 1980s (Table 1). As of 
January 1990, the Census Bureau is reporting 
Canadian import data in lieu of U.S. export data to 
represent U.S. exports to Canada (Davis, Good-loe, 
and Gill). 
Direct Effects of the FTA 
The agricultural provisions, despite being targeted 
at specific bilateral trade irritants rather than de-
signed to bring about policy reform or harmoni-
zation, have produced a variety of effects, both 
Table 1.    Comparison of U.S. Export Data 
and Canadian Import Data 
  U.S.      Percentage 
Year  Exports  Canadian Imports
3  Difference Difference
b 
  ----------  Million U.S. Dollars  ----------- Percent 
1968 596 528 68 11
1969  712  600  112  16
1970  826  639  187  23
1971  760  698  62  8
1972  843  822  21  2
1973  1,034  1,221  -187  -18
1974  1,281  1,614  -333  -26
1975  1,304  1,566  -262  -20
1976  1,484  1,858  -374  -25
1977  ,534  1,924  -390  -25
1978  ,621  2,018  -397  -24
1979  ,647  2,286  -639  -39
1980  ,852  2,494  -642  -35
1981  ,988  2,722  -734  -37
1982  1,820  2,481  -661  -36
1983  1,844  2,531  -687  -37
1984  1,963  2,787  -824  -42
1985  1,622  2,514  -892  -55
1986  1,542  2,617  -1,075  -70
1987  1,808  2,934  -1,126  -62
1988  2,019  3,218  -1,181  -58
1989  2,228  3,600  - 1 ,372  -62
a Canadian data converted to U.S. dollars using an annual average 
exchange rate. 
h Difference divided by U.S. export data. 
direct and indirect. Most of the measurable trade 
effects stem from tariff reduction and changes in 
Canada's poultry quotas (Table 2). 
Tariff reduction. On January 1, 1990, tariffs on 
most agricultural products came down 10 percent 
as part of the general tariff reduction provisions. 
Tariffs on some items were completely removed 
and on others were dropped 20 percent. In addition, 
Article 401.5 of the FTA provides for accelerated 
tariff reduction, subject to agreement by both sides. 
On April 1, 1990, tariffs on about twenty agricul-
tural items (including animal carcasses, honey, var-
ious cereal products, oilmeals, lard and other animal 
fats, and pet food) fell to zero. 
Because agricultural tariffs are generally low and 
not significant barriers to trade, tariff removal was 
not a contentious issue. Using three simplifying 
assumptions of complete pass-through to consumers 
of tariff reductions, import demand elasticities of 
1.0 for both countries, and an average tariff rate for 
food products (3.8% for the U.S. and 5.4% for 
Canada), one can estimate the one-year impact of 
tariff removal on U.S. agricultural exports to and 
imports from Canada. About 8 percent of the $382 
million increase in U.S. agricultural exports to 
Canada in 1989 can be attributed to Canadian tariff 
reduction. Similarly, about 5 percent of the $473 
million increase in U.S. agricultural imports from 
Canada can be attributed to U.S. tariff reduction. 
Tariff snapback. Tariffs on fresh produce are 
scheduled to come down 10 percent annually, but 
the special tariff provision in Article 702 allows 
the tariff to revert back to its previous higher level 
for up to 180 days if certain price and acreage 
conditions are met. On May 4, 1990, the special 
tariff provisions for fresh fruits and vegetables were 
exercised for the first time. Canada "snapbacked" 
its tariff on U.S. fresh asparagus imports from 12 
percent to 15 percent. Estimating the impact of this 
slightly higher tariff is not possible at this point, 
although the U.S. asparagus industry noted that the 
bulk of fresh exports come from California, whose 
season is almost over (U.S. Department of Agri-
culture/Economic Research Service). 
Table 2.    Direct Trade Effects of the FTA 
Policy  U.S. Exports  U.S. Imports 
  Million U.S  . Dollars
Tariff reduction 32.0  24.0
Poultry quotas 13.6  NA
Chicken 9.2  NA
Turkey 2.4  NA
Shell eggs 3.0 NA
Oats 0.3  NA
Total change 45.9  24.0
1989 trade 3,600.0  2,915.682    October 1990  NJARE 
Since this provision was included in the FTA 
mainly at the insistence of Canada, given the vul-
nerability of its horticultural industry to low-priced 
imports, it is not surprising that Canada was the 
first to invoke it. From the U.S. perspective, al-
though the possibility exists that the snapback could 
be used against Canadian exports of certain storage 
vegetables (potatoes, carrots, onions), the cost of 
developing and maintaining a price and acreage 
database for over fifty fruits and vegetables will 
likely outweigh any U.S. benefits received from 
higher tariffs. 
On the other hand, this provision will be in effect 
for twenty years. Any price impacts will be much 
greater the further out into the twenty-year period 
the snapback is used. After ten years, tariffs will 
be zero. At that time, the price effect of reverting 
to the most favored nation (MFN) rates, which 
currently range from 10 to 15 percent on most fruits 
and vegetables, will be substantial. 
Support calculations for wheat, barley, and 
oats. The support calculations represent the first 
and novel use of an "aggregate measure of sup-
port," a concept that has been talked about and 
used in academic circles for several years. The FTA 
may be the first official government-to-government 
agreement to contain algebra. The provision is 
structured such that if the U.S. lowers its subsidies, it 
is rewarded with increased market access. 
Support calculations are based on a two-year 
average level of support and have been done for 
two years. The 1989 calculations showed U.S. sup-
port levels higher for wheat and barley, but lower 
for oats. Canada was obligated to remove its import 
licensing requirement for oats. Since the U.S. is a 
large oat importer from Canada, removal of the 
licensing requirement was not expected to have 
much effect. U.S. oat exports rose marginally in 
1989. However, even if one assumes all of the 
increase in U.S. oat exports in 1989 ($284,000) 
was a result of the license removal, this value is 
only slightly more than the cost of paying lots of 
bureaucrats and lawyers to wrangle over the cal-
culations! 
The 1990 calculations showed U.S. support levels 
for wheat and barley were still above Canadian 
levels. The wheat calculations were very close— 
45.80 percent for the U.S. versus 44.83 percent 
for Canada. The U.S. starts out next year with a 
strong advantage: U.S. wheat support for 1988-
89 (one-half of next year's support level) is 30.36 
percent compared to 43.10 percent for Canada. 
The direct effect of the grain-support cal-
culations—including the removal of Canada's oat 
license requirement—has been straightforward and 
relatively insignificant. But there have been several 
indirect effects, of relevance mostly to Canada, 
which will be discussed below. 
Changes in poultry import quotas. Canada en-
larged its global poultry import quotas to equal 
actual imports over the previous five years. The 
new global quota is now equal to the old global 
quota plus any supplemental quotas, which Canada 
often issued in addition to the global quota. Ca-
nadian chicken, turkey, and shell egg imports grew 
substantially in 1989 over 1988 (Table 3). 
As with other aspects of the FTA, to ascribe 
changes in trade to specific FTA provisions is dif-
ficult. For chicken and shell eggs, since actual 1989 
imports exceeded both the old and the new quotas, 
some of the increase would likely have occurred 
even without the new, larger quota. Assuming the 
difference between the old and new quotas repre-
sents additional U.S. exports, U.S. chicken exports 
increased $9.2 million and turkey exports $2.4 mil-
lion. For shell eggs, the difference between the old 
and new quotas was greater than the increase in 
U.S. exports. However, if one attributes all of the 
increase in exports to the new quota, U.S. shell 
egg exports increased $3 million. 
Changes in Canadian wine policies. For many 
years, the U.S. and the European Community (EC) 
complained about discriminatory Canadian prac-
tices on wine imports. U.S. wine producers felt 
 
Table 3.    Canadian Poultry Quotas and Imports 
    Old    New         1989 Imports     
    Quota    Quota 1988 Old New 
Item    Level
3    Level" Imports Quota Quota  Actual
    --------  - Percent  ---------   ---------- --------- ------- Metric Tons- ------  -------- ---------
Chicken    6.3    7.5 41,000 34,000 40.500  47,000
Turkey    2.0    3.5 2,000 2,400 4,105  4,000
Shell eggs
b    .675    1.647   293   186 454    496
Sources: Agriculture Canada, ERS, Foreign Agricultural Service. 
a 
Expressed as a percentage of production. 
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they could export more wine to Canada if these 
wine policies were altered. Chapter 8 of the FTA 
provides for equal treatment of domestic and im-
ported wine, with a few exceptions. Although im-
plementation of Chapter 8 has been slow, especially 
in Ontario, 1989 data indicate the wine provisions 
appear to have had an impact on U.S. exports (Table 
4). The quantity of U.S. wine exports increased 
sharply, but the value only slightly, meaning the 
export unit value fell dramatically. 
Shortly after the FTA went into effect, one re-
searcher asked, with the advantages eroding for 
Canadian domestic wine, whether demand for wines 
for blending would increase (Lindsey). Based on 
one year of data, the answer may be yes, assuming 
the lower-value wine is bulk rather than bottled 
wine. Whether this situation of bulk versus bottled 
wine continues will be interesting to monitor. U.S. 
producers would no doubt prefer to tap into the 
more profitable bottled-wine market, but whether 
and how fast this occurs depends on how quickly 
provinces implement the FTA provisions. 
Indirect Effects of the FTA 
The indirect effects of the FTA, while not mea-
surable, are more significant in terms of policy 
changes and potential trade effects than the direct 
effects described above. The indirect effects point 
out that the FTA provisions affecting agriculture, 
while seemingly limited in intent, are having re-
percussions on the agricultural policy process in 
both countries. Although many of the potential 
changes would fall hardest on Canada, the U.S. 
has a major interest in the effect of the changes. 
Canadian quotas on dairy products. Within two 
months after the FTA was initialed and a year be-
fore it came into force, Canada put various dairy 
products on its Import Control List, meaning a 
license was required to import these products. The 
U.S. protested the action before the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Thus began 
the saga that illustrates Canada's basic farm policy 
dilemma, both in the FTA and in the current Mul-
tilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN): how to support 
Table 4.    U.S. Wine Exports to Canada 
Item  1988  1989 
Quantity (HL
a)  15,082  197,150 
Value (thousand $U.S.) 13,078 17,861
Unit value (SUS/HL)  867  91
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service. 
a Hectoliter. 
producers, by raising farm prices above import levels, 
without jeopardizing the competitiveness of the 
food-processing sector, which is forced to buy 
higher-priced domestic raw products. 
The problem came to a head when the FTA was 
signed. Tariffs on processed dairy and poultry 
products are relatively high to protect domestic pro-
cessors. (Canadian processors of fruit, vegetables, 
malting barley, and, until recently, wheat face a 
similar situation; horticultural products are not reg-
ulated by supply-management systems but are usually 
subject to some marketing board requirements.) Even 
though the FTA leaves both countries' dairy policies 
untouched, tariffs will still come down on all dairy 
products. In Canada, most dairy products are 
subject to quotas or licensing requirements as part 
of the supply-management system that regulates 
production, prices, and trade. Yogurt, ice cream, 
and some other products, however, were not 
covered by the import quotas. Canadian producers 
were afraid as tariffs fell, they would face stiff 
competition from lower-priced U.S. imports. The 
dairy industry successfully petitioned the gov-
ernment to restrict imports of these products. 
Even though Canada's supply-management sys-
tems for dairy and poultry are "legal" under GATT 
Article XI, which allows import restrictions in con-
junction with domestic production controls, the 
GATT ruled in September 1989 that yogurt and ice 
cream could not be placed under quotas because 
they were not "like products" to milk. Canada 
refused to make any policy changes (The Econo-
mist) until after the MTN is over in December 
(citing a U.S. delay in changing its patent-
infringement procedures) and is now working to 
"strengthen" GATT Article XI, meaning change 
the article so more products can be brought under 
its sway. 
The U.S. is watching these developments closely 
from both a bilateral and multilateral perspective. 
The U.S. will no doubt continue to push Canada 
to open its import market for U.S. products under 
the aegis of the FTA. Canada's stance in the GATT is 
also key; the two countries have generally agreed on 
the objective of eliminating trade-distorting ag-
ricultural subsidies. However, Canada's Article XI 
proposal runs counter to that objective and could 
lead to tensions between the two countries. Canada 
may ultimately be faced with either dismantling its 
supply-management systems or becoming more 
protectionist by sealing its border to imports to 
maintain the systems. 
Changes in the Canadian Wheat Board. The 
combination of Article 705 and one part of Article 
701 is leading to some interesting developments 84    October 1990 
concerning the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), ar-
guably the most important institution in Canadian 
agriculture, and one the U.S. watches closely. To 
protect the integrity of its export monopoly on wheat, 
barley, and oats, the CWB required import li-
censes, which were rarely issued. This system al-
lowed Canada to maintain a two-price situation for 
wheat (and a de facto one for malting barley). After 
the passage of the 1985 U.S. Farm Bill, as world 
prices began to fall, Canadian domestic wheat prices 
greatly exceeded Canadian export prices. 
Even before the FTA went into effect, the CWB 
announced changes in the two-price wheat policy 
for the 1988-89 marketing year. Prices would be 
adjusted every two months, rather than being fixed, 
based on conditions prevailing in the North Amer-
ican market. Although the gap between domestic 
and export prices had become politically untenable, 
the prospect of the import license being removed 
as a result of Article 705 was likely a consideration 
as well. The CWB has announced that it will move 
to daily wheat pricing for the 1990-91 marketing 
year. 
Several developments have also surrounded oats 
marketing. Even before the 1989 support calcula-
tions were completed, there was widespread feeling 
that Canadian support levels for oats would be above 
U.S. levels. In early 1989, the CWB announced 
that oats would no longer be under its jurisdiction 
beginning in August 1989. The announcement 
aroused much domestic opposition from farm groups 
who said they had not been adequately consulted 
about the change. Although officially unconnected, 
the timing of the announcement was curious. 
In January 1990, the CWB announced the final 
payments for the 1988-89 marketing year, the last 
year the CWB marketed oats. The feed-oats pool 
was in deficit by CDN $32 million. Because of 
record CWB oat exports to the U.S., the question 
whether Canada violated Article 701.3 (exporting 
goods below acquisition cost) has been raised. The 
deficit highlights U.S. concerns about CWB price 
transparency; that is, that the CWB does not reveal 
sales prices. 
The U.S. government for some time has felt that 
the monopoly pricing and export authority of the 
CWB gives it an unfair advantage in the highly 
competitive world wheat market. CWB pricing has 
also been an issue in the debate over large durum 
wheat exports to the U.S. the past few years. By 
not revealing its sales prices, the CWB is probably 
better able to extract that last dollar per ton out of a 
customer. The U.S. implementing legislation for the 
FTA specifies review of CWB pricing policies to 
ensure compliance with Article 701.3. The U.S. 
government will continue to press Canada and the 
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CWB to make clear at what prices goods are sold 
to the U.S. 
Opening the border to grain, especially wheat, 
poses considerable difficulties for the CWB. Would 
U.S. wheat interfere with Canada's complex grading 
and transportation systems? Would U.S. wheat end 
up comingled with Canadian wheat and receive the 
subsidized freight rates? Opening the border 
means opening Pandora's box for the CWB. Per-
haps the CWB chose to remove oats from its ju-
risdiction because it was not sure how to resolve 
these questions, if even for a small quantity of oats 
imports. 
These changes and events, seemingly trivial in 
isolation, add up to considerable pressure on how 
the CWB operates, not just in respect of U.S. trade 
but in its overall operations. Couple an open border 
with more transparent pricing and the CWB loses a 
tremendous advantage in marketing wheat. As-
suming the calculations show U.S. wheat support 
levels to be lower next year, the CWB has a year 
to figure out how to deal with an open border. The 
FTA may prove to have resounding implications 
for one of Canada's foremost institutions, possibly 
to the U.S.'s advantage in world grain trade. 
Changing nature of beef trade. Under Article 
704, both countries are excluded from each other's 
meat import laws. Even though pre-FTA beef trade 
was relatively free, the expected result of this pro-
vision, as indeed with the entire FTA, is to shift 
trade from an east-west flow, especially in Canada, to 
a north-south (cross-border) flow. Although other 
factors besides the FTA are at work (the opening 
of the Japanese and Korean beef markets is influ-
encing the entire Pacific Rim beef trade), this shift 
seems to be occurring. More beef is being exported 
to the U.S. from western Canada, while U.S. ex-
ports into Ontario and Quebec are growing. The 
trade patterns mirror changes in the Canadian cattle 
sector, where herds are increasing in the West but 
declining in the East. The FTA may have been a 
factor in the opening of a large, modern beef packing 
plant in Calgary in 1989. The plant is expected to 
reduce Canadian feeder cattle imports from the 
U.S. and increase Canadian fed beef exports to the 
U.S. (Dyck). 
Changes in meat inspections. On February 26, 
1990, the U.S. and Canada announced they had 
agreed to a one-year test that would allow meat 
products to move freely across the border without 
routine reinspections. Each country would accept 
each other's meat inspection procedures (USDA/ 
Foreign Agricultural Service). This decision fol-
lows in the wake of a growing controversy about 
U.S. inspection procedures after the FTA went into 
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U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) gave the 
green light to private U.S. companies to build in-
spection stations on the border. This decision re-
flected an earlier U.S. decision to inspect meat at 
border points rather than at destinations (Keller). 
But with the passing of the FTA, Article 708.3 
called for harmonization or acceptance of each other's 
inspections systems. Just when the FTA was 
calling for peace and harmony on the border, the 
U.S. stepped up the intensity of its inspections, 
about which the Canadians claimed harassment and 
increased expense due to a high rate of rejections. 
The announcement has met with opposition from the 
U.S. Congress and has not yet been imple-
mented. The proposed changes have raised ques-
tions about the legal authority under the FTA to 
change U.S. inspection procedures as well as USDA 
procedures to determine whether Canadian inspec-
tion procedures are equivalent to U.S. procedures. 
This issue will be an interesting test case to see 
how provisions under Article 708 (technical reg-
ulations) are implemented. 
What Has the FTA Not Done? 
The FTA has not automatically ushered in a har-
monious trading environment and solved all the 
bilateral trade issues. In fact, as described above, 
the FTA has managed to create some new head-
aches and intensify some old problems. The dis-
putes have ranged from apples to wool, with bees, 
beer, and just about everything else in between. 
Trade Issues Abound 
In addition to placing dairy products under quotas, 
in 1989 Canada also put antidumping duties on 
U.S. red delicious apples and sour cherries. In May 
1989, Canada imposed an import quota on broiler 
hatching eggs and day-old chicks under the aus-
pices of the newly created Canadian Broiler Hatching 
Egg Marketing Agency. The U.S. requested 
GAIT consultations to investigate whether the quota 
was consistent with GATT requirements, but the 
issue is still not resolved. 
There is another long-standing issue that con-
cerns the Canadian marketing board for eggs, the 
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency (CEMA). CEMA 
purchases all eggs; eggs in excess of domestic de-
mand are sold at a discount to processors which 
make them into egg products .U.S. producers claim 
that exports of these egg products are sometimes 
dumped into the U.S., depressing U.S. prices. A 
U.S. producer group maintains that CEMA is a 
public entity and is violating Article 701.3. The 
issue has not yet been resolved {USDA/Foreign 
Agricultural Service). 
The U.S. is also protesting new grade-labeling 
regulations for fresh produce implemented by Can-
ada on January 1, 1990. The regulations require 
grade labeling on all fresh produce shipped in con-
sumer-size packages. Since the rules do not apply 
to produce grown and traded in the same province 
(about 70 percent), the U.S. feels imports are un-
duly affected. The U.S. is considering several 
options to resolve the issue (USDA/Foreign Ag-
ricultural Service). 
Durum Wheat and Pork Imports Trouble U.S. 
From the U.S. perspective, two major trade prob-
lems have loomed large since the FTA went into 
effect—imports of durum wheat and pork from 
Canada. U.S. durum wheat imports began increasing 
in 1986-87, much to the consternation of U.S. 
durum growers. The U.S. International Trade 
Commission was asked to conduct a study on the 
competitiveness of the U.S. and Canadian durum 
sectors, to be released June 22, 1990. This issue 
raises again the question of CWB price transpar-
ency, since some U.S. producers claim Canadian 
durum has been dumped in violation of Article 
701.3. 
The issue of Canadian hog and pork imports has 
been around since Canadian imports of live hogs 
began accelerating in 1984. A U.S. countervailing 
duty (CVD) was placed on hog imports in 1985 
and on pork imports in 1989. Canada protested the 
CVD and called for a panel under the FTA dispute 
settlement mechanism. A ruling will be issued in 
the fall to determine whether the U.S. CVD was 
issued consistent with U.S. law. 
U.S. Sugar Policy Gets Even Stickier 
Sugar has been a sticky issue between the U.S. 
and Canada ever since the U.S. put quotas on sugar in 
1982. As U.S. and world sugar prices began to 
diverge, U.S. importers found it profitable to im-
port sugar-containing products, made with lower-
priced world sugar, from Canada and other coun-
tries to extract the sugar. The U.S. responded by 
putting quotas on some sugar-containing products. 
Canada pressed this issue in the FTA negotiations 
and was granted a concession in the form of Article 
707. 
When the U.S. converted to the Harmonized 
System of tariff codes, effective January 1, 1989, 
significant exports of Canadian sugar blends were 
reclassified as quota sugar. Canada protested the 
change, claiming that CDN $30 million worth of 86   October 1990  NJARE 
sugar blends were affected (USDA/Foreign Agri-
cultural Service). Canada has threatened to retaliate 
by withdrawing concessions on U.S. products. The 
issue remains unresolved. 
A GATT ruling in June 1989, on a complaint 
by Australia, found U.S. sugar import quotas vi-
olated Article XI. The U.S. accepted the GATT 
ruling and is now exploring options to bring the 
U.S. sugar program into compliance. Several pro-
posals have been put forth as part of the 1990 farm 
bill process. Any proposal will have to balance the 
preferential treatment now accorded Canada under 
the FTA with limits on Canadian access so as not 
to disrupt any new U.S. sugar regime (McNair). 
Can Trade Issues Be Solved? 
To summarize the nature of the trade disputes that 
remain impervious to easy solution despite the FTA 
reveals the conflict between agricultural policies 
that support producers and freer trade in agricul-
tural products, the selfsame issue with which the 
MTN is grappling. Trade issues have revolved 
around (1) highly protected, politically sensitive 
sectors—for example, dairy, sugar, and horticulture 
(in Canada); (2) institutions that isolate producers 
from world market signals and are not 
transparent in their actions (Canada's marketing 
boards); or (3) alleged unfair, inconsistent use of 
trade protection laws (U.S. countervailing and 
antidumping laws). That these issues have not yet 
been successfully resolved in the bilateral context 
between two relatively friendly, peaceful traders 
does not bode well for a successful MTN conclu-
sion. 
What Might the FTA Do in the Future? 
After grinding through the minutiae of agricultural 
trade effects and disputes, is it possible to sit back 
and put the FTA in a broader perspective? As two 
authors put it, is the FTA a "special case or the 
wave of the future?" (Lipsey and Smith). 
The Rise of Preferential Trading Arrangements 
The recently concluded FTA, the greater economic 
integration envisioned under the European Com-
munity's (EC) 1992 program, and the slow prog-
ress in the current MTN have focused attention on 
preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) as alter-
natives to the multilateral system codified under 
GATT. The increase in preferential arrangements 
has raised concerns that their proliferation will have 
adverse effects for the world trading system. (The 
following material is taken from Goodloe and Nor-
mile.) 
Shortcomings of the GATT. By most assess-
ments, the GATT has been instrumental in fostering 
a favorable climate for international trade since its 
creation in 1948. However, changes in the structure 
of international trade and the major players have 
strained the multilateral system and revealed 
GATT's shortcomings. The task of dealing with 
nontariff barriers (NTBs) and extending GATT dis-
ciplines to new areas, such as services, agriculture, 
and intellectual property rights, will make it harder 
to achieve the same success as in the past. The 
increasingly slow and complex multilateral process 
has led frustrated but like-minded countries to pursue 
alternative trade arrangements outside the GAIT to 
achieve greater, more rapid liberalization, such as 
the 1988 U.S. beef and citrus agreement with 
Japan and the U.S.-Canada FTA. In addition, U.S. 
frustration with large trade deficits with the East 
Asian countries has led to increasing use of uni-
lateral trade legislation, import relief measures, and 
so-called "grey area" measures (such as voluntary 
export restraints) to deal with the deficits. 
Why enter into PTAs? Economic forces may 
compel countries to enter into formal preferential 
trading arrangements or result in informal trading 
blocs as trade becomes more concentrated within a 
region. One rationale for concluding a PTA is 
that the expected gains from bilateral or regional 
liberalization would be greater than from multilat-
eral liberalization. An example is Canada's desire 
to conclude a free-trade agreement with the U.S. 
With Canada's trade dependence on the U.S. market 
already high—in 1988, 73 percent of Canada's 
exports went to and 66 percent of imports came 
from the U.S.—and a perception of growing U.S. 
protectionism, Canada concluded there were greater 
economic benefits to be gained from a bilateral 
FTA than from waiting on the uncertain outcome 
of the MTN. 
Additionally, a country may be willing to make 
bilateral concessions that it would never make uni-
lateral^. Canada gained some concessions—for 
example, in the areas of services and dispute 
settlement—which the U.S. would not likely con-
cede in a multilateral agreement. 
Another economic rationale is to improve domestic 
economic efficiency. The expected gains that 
would come from unilateral liberalization, as in-
creased competition forces domestic producers to 
become more efficient, may lead a country to seek a 
formal agreement to provide the impetus and 
discipline for liberalization. This economic motive 
has been ascribed to Canada in its pursuit of a U.S. 
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was losing its international competitiveness, and a 
way to force change was to open the border to the 
full impact of the more efficient U.S. economy. 
U.S.-Canada intra-regional trade 
as share of total trade 
Political and strategic motives may also play a 
role in forming PTAs. Countries may enter into 
PTAs as part of a strategy to signal their intentions 
to seek alternatives to the multilateral system, a 
U.S. motive underlying the agreements with both 
Israel and Canada. 
Agriculture and PTAs. Nearly all existing PTAs 
encountered difficulty in incorporating agricultural 
products into the initial agreement. Agriculture has 
proven difficult to liberalize within PTAs for the 
same reasons that it has proved to be a sticking 
point in the GATT. In most PTAs, the agricultural 
sector has usually benefited less from across-the-
board reductions in tariffs or nontariff barriers. In 
some cases, agricultural products are excluded from 
trade concessions altogether. The agricultural pro-
visions in the U.S.-Canada FTA were not com-
prehensive, except for tariff reduction, and left each 
country's agricultural policies basically intact. Special 
treatment, or a general exclusion from treatment 
for agriculture, was also the case in the formation 
of the EC, the European Free Trade Area, the New 
Zealand-Australia Closer Economics Relations 
Agreement, the U.S.-Israel Free Trade 
Agreement, and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations. 
PTAs and changes in trade patterns. An as-
sessment of the various PTAs' effects on trade is 
complicated by many factors, including the diverse 
nature and objectives of an agreement and the time 
period for which it has been in force. A formal 
PTA may grow out of an already highly concen-
trated trade relationship, such as Canada's with the 
U.S. In this case, a formal trade agreement may 
have limited effects on intratrade because many of 
the opportunities have already been exploited. 
PTAs can be assessed according to whether they 
stimulate internal trade relative to external trade. 
Two general indicators—intraregional exports as a 
share of total exports (trade concentration) and 
growth in intraexports relative to growth in total 
exports (intragrowth)—can indicate whether internal 
trade has increased relative to external trade. 
The U.S.-Canada FTA has only been in effect 
since January 1, 1989, so it is not yet possible to 
assess its effects on total trade. Trade concentration 
data show two cycles (Figure 1). Concentration 
rose until the early 1970s, then fell until 1980 when it 
rose again. Intragrowth tells a similar story; intra-
exports grew faster than total exports in 1963-71, 
slower in 1972-81, and then exceeded total export 
growth again in 1982-88 (Table 5). As intratrade 
became more concentrated in the 1980s—and par- 
Figure 1.    U.S.-Canada Intraregional Trade 
as Share of Total Trade 
ticularly as Canada's trade became more dependent 
on the U.S. market—, Canada sought out formal 
confirmation of its bilateral trade relationship. 
Interestingly, in 1989, the first year the FTA was 
in effect, bilateral trade, especially agricultural trade, 
generally grew faster than total trade (Table 6). 
U.S. agricultural exports to Canada increased twice 
as fast as total U.S. agricultural exports. The story 
was even more dramatic for Canada; total and ag-
ricultural exports to the world actually fell in 1989, 
while rising to the U.S. If the logical outcome of a 
PTA, in this case a free-trade agreement, is to 
increase internal trade relative to external trade, 
sketchy evidence for one year indicates the FTA is 
having such an effect. 
The Outlook for PTAs 
What is the outlook for the world trading en-
vironment—a tighter, more comprehensive GATT 
Table 5.    U.S. and Canada: Growth in Total 
and Intraregional Trade 
Item 1963-71  1972-81 1982-88
    Percent   
U.S. -Canada    
Exports to world 8.6  15.7 5.5
Exports to region 12.8  12.8 7.7
Agricultural exports to 4.1  16.3 0
world    
Agricultural exports to 5.2  13.0 4.8
region       
World exports*       
Total exports 9.6  17.0 7.0
Agricultural exports 5.4  13.6 2.9
Sources: U.N. trade data; Agriculture Canada; ERS. 
a 
1962-71. 88    October 1990  NJARE 
Table 6.    U.S. and Canadian Exports, 1987-89 
    Change    Change
  from 1987    from 1988
Item  1987 1988 1989 to 1988    to 1989
  -------  - - Mil, $U.S---- -----------      -----------  Percent -------------- 
U.S. exports  243.7 308.0 349.6 26    8
U.S. agricultural exports  30.9 37.1 40.0 20    8
U.S. exports to Canada  56.9 70.3 73.9 18    5
U.S. agricultural exports to Canada  2.9 3.2 3.6 10    12
Canadian exports 
 
92.9 117.7 115.4 21 
 
  -   1
Canadian agricultural exports 7.2 8.3 7.4 15 11
Canadian exports to the U.S.  70.4 81.8 84.7 16    4
Canadian agricultural exports to the U.S.  2.2 2.4 2.9 10    13   
system or an even more fragmented, managed trade 
system characterized by PTAs? In the near term, 
the expansion of PTAs will likely continue. Forces 
already in motion will lead to greater integration 
among existing PTAs, will expand some PTAs to 
include more countries, and may formalize ties 
among regional trading partners with new agree-
ments. 
Much depends on the outcome of the Uruguay 
Round, where resolution of agricultural issues is 
key. If the most contentious issues can be resolved 
in a satisfactory manner that results in a strength-
ened GATT system, some of the impetus to forge 
PTAs will be removed. A failed MTN suggests the 
opposite course will be followed. A third possible 
outcome is a continuation of the current system 
where a kind of dual trading system exists in which 
countries rely both on the GAIT and PTAs to achieve 
their trade objectives (such as the U.S. and Canada 
are now following). 
Conclusions 
Two themes already emerge from the FTA. Al-
though more apparent for the nonagricultural sec-
tors, these themes apply to agriculture as well. 
Despite many ongoing trade disputes, the FTA has 
constrained agricultural policy actions and influ-
enced policy decisions, which ultimately limit na-
tional sovereignty. An example is the contemplated 
changes in U.S. sugar policy, where U.S. policy-
makers have to make sure a new policy does not 
violate the FTA, and in U.S. meat inspection pro-
cedures, when the U.S. would change an estab-
lished system as a result of the FTA. Canada has 
made several policy changes, either directly or in-
directly, as a result of the FTA—transition pay-
ments to grape growers, changes in the two-price 
wheat system, and removal of the oats import li-
cense. 
A related theme is that as the FTA constrains 
policy options, even in a limited way for agricul-
ture, it expands economic opportunities. One re-
porter, in examining growing economic activity on 
the U.S.-Canadian border, concluded that the FTA 
"is blurring the border between the world's two 
biggest trading partners, encouraging both com-
panies and consumers to base their decisions on 
market forces rather than political frontiers" (Si-
mon). This emphasis on economics rather than pol-
itics, also evident in the EC 1992 process and the 
developments in Eastern Europe, is rendering na-
tional boundaries obsolete with respect to economic 
activity. In a future world where political bound-
aries become less important than economic prow-
ess, perhaps the FTA will be seen as an early step 
in an inevitable process of world economic inte-
gration. 
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